










Social Welfare versus Inequality Concerns 









CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2933 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Social Welfare versus Inequality Concerns 





We study a situation where two players first choose a sharing rule, then invest into a joint 
production process, and then split joint benefits. We investigate how social preferences 
determine investments. In our experiment we find that even the materially disadvantaged 
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an advantageous sharing rule. Power-sharing can be successful in the experiment, even when 
it is not in a selfish world. 
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An essential characteristic of a successful partnership is that all parties in-
volved have an incentive to make signiﬁcant relationship-speciﬁc investments.
However, it is not uncommon that one partner has more power than an-
other and is therefore able to appropriate a large share of the overall beneﬁts
that accrue from the partnership. In a world with costly contracting, such
power imbalances may aﬀect resource allocations by shaping the incentives
of individuals to undertake productive activities that enhance the value of
partnership projects.
Power imbalances abound in many real world partnerships. The dis-
tinctive feature of sharecropping contracts in the agricultural sector is the
division of product between tenants and landlords according to some pre-
determined share-out. The tenant’s share of output has been observed to
be as low as 20 percent in Southern India (Tomlinson, 1996, p. 81) or as
high as 80 percent in Argentina in the 1890s (Adelman, 1994, p. 137). In a
supplier-manufacturer relationship in the automotive industry, the supplier
may have no comparable demanders for its parts other than the manufac-
turer. Consequently, the incentive for the manufacturer to appropriate quasi
rents by negotiating a revised lower price at which it will accept parts from
the supplier may be large (Klein et al., 1978). Power imbalances also exist
in company-community partnerships in the developing world, particularly in
those related to the ‘fair trade’ commercialization of non-timber forest prod-
ucts in Brazilian Amazonia (Morsello, 2006).1 Aspects of trade deals between
large corporations and communities which have led to power asymmetries are
premium prices and single buyers (Corry, 1993; Turner, 1995), which dras-
tically undermine communities’ negotiating power (Mayers and Vermeulen,
2002). In consequence, corporations typically appropriate larger portions of
the overall beneﬁts accruing from company-community partnerships.
The objective of this paper is to investigate experimentally whether power
imbalances between trading partners discourage or encourage relationship-
speciﬁc investment when contracts are incomplete. Since the seminal work
of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), it is well under-
1While initially the commercialization of these products was promoted primarily by
non-governmental organizations, corporations such as The Body Shop or Ives Rocher now
dominate the scene, having been encouraged by increased demand for environmentally and
socially responsible products (Morsello and Adger, 2006)
1stood that there is a close connection between the allocation of power—as
determined by the allocation of private control and property rights—and
the incentives of partners to undertake relationship-speciﬁc investments. In
this paper we build on this literature to consider how the balance of power
between trading partners impacts on their investment behavior in an experi-
mental setting. Our main contribution lies in providing new insights into the
behavioral motives that enter partners’ investment decisions when complete
contracts are infeasible. To this end, we develop a simple model of incomple
contracts based on social preferences, and use the theoretical results to guide
our way of interpreting the data from our experiment.
Our experiment has the following main features. Two equally productive
players simultaneously decide how much to invest into a joint production
process. These investments cannot be speciﬁed in an ex-ante contract. The
total monetary beneﬁt from the production process is a Cobb-Douglas trans-
formation of the players’ respective investments. A sharing rule determines
how the total monetary beneﬁt from joint production is split between the
two players. Under a symmetric or “balanced-power” partnership structure,
each player is entitled to an (almost) equal share of the total monetary ben-
eﬁt. Under an asymmetric or“imbalanced-power”partnership structure, the
power-advantaged player receives a substantially larger share of the total
monetary beneﬁt than the weak player. Throughout the experiment, we
elicit not only players’ own investment strategies, but also their beliefs about
their partners’ investment strategies.
Our experimental design allows us to address two sets of questions. The
ﬁrst set is: How do power imbalances between trading partners aﬀect in-
centives to make relationship-speciﬁc investments? What behavioral mo-
tives do we detect when we compare partners’ investment behavior under
balanced and imbalanced power structures? To get at these questions, we
exogenously impose both the (symmetric) balanced-power and the (asym-
metric) imbalanced-power partnership structure on the players and examine
their investment behavior. We show that no allocation of power induces
ﬁrst best investments, but some allocations are more eﬃcient than others.
In particular, since the players are equally productive, in our setup theory
predicts that total investments would be lower in the presence of power im-
balances. This is conﬁrmed by our experimental evidence. However, we also
observe behavioral motives entering the players’ investment behavior. An
2interesting feature of our design is that it allows us to clearly disentangle
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) from social-welfare concerns
(Charness and Rabin, 2002). Diﬀerently from numerous other experiments
in which a Pareto-improvement also decreases inequality, in our case the
only way equally inequality averse players can lower payoﬀ diﬀerences in
equilibrium is by investing less eﬃciently. On the other hand, if players are
concerned about social-welfare they will raise their investment. We ﬁnd that
when power is shared equally both players invest strictly more than the prin-
ciple of own-payoﬀ maximization would suggest. Also under the imbalanced-
power structure, both types of players invest more than predicted by Nash
equilibrium, although overinvestment is higher among strong players. This
behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals are concerned with
social eﬃciency (Charness and Rabin, 2002), while it cannot be explained by
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Having established this, we turn our attention to the following question:
Under what conditions would a player which is advantaged by an asymmet-
ric sharing rule agree to “tie her hands” and sign a contract that establishes
symmetric sharing? For example, in a company-community deal in a devel-
oping country, a large corporation may have to decide whether to agree to
contracts and mechanisms that allow fairer negotiations between the trade
partners (Morsello, 2006). To address this issue, the following experimental
procedure is adopted. Players ﬁrst invest into joint production under both
the symmetric and asymmetric sharing rule. Then, after having gained some
experience, the players are allowed to switch from an asymmetric rule to a
symmetric one. This switch requires mutual consent. Theory predicts that
the disadvantaged player always has an incentive to switch to more symmet-
ric rules.2 For the advantaged player the situation is less clear: Switching
to a symmetric rule generates better incentives for total investment but also
reduces this player’s share of the joint proﬁt. We analyze two situations, one
in which it is individually rational for strong players to switch to a more equal
structure, and one in which they should theoretically refuse to do so. Our
key results are the following. Disadvantaged players almost always vote for a
balanced-power partnership structure, as one would probably expect. What
is more intriguing is the behavior of advantaged players, which exhibits a sub-
2This is because both total investments and weak players’ shares of the beneﬁts would
increase as a result.
3stantial degree of heterogeneity. Surprisingly, a majority of strong players are
willing to give up their strong position irrespective of whether it is individu-
ally rational or not. However, there are also participants who are disinclined
to abandon power even when the principle of own-payoﬀ maximization tells
them to do so.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
related experimental literature. Section 3 describes the experimental features
and setup. Section 4 generates behavioral prediction. Section 5 presents the
results. Section 6 concludes
2 Related Experiments
Despite the mounting evidence that economic agents exhibit so-
cial preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Charness and Rabin, 2002), scholars have only recently started to focus
on the analysis and implications of the incomplete contract approach
when the neoclassical self-interest paradigm does not hold (Hart, 2008;
Hart and Moore, 2008). Furthermore there is virtually no experimental evi-
dence testing the predictions of this kind of models.
One notable exception and the closest antecedent to this paper is
Fehr et al. (2008b) who use experiments to compare diﬀerent allocations of
ownership rights.3 The key ﬁnding of this study, which contrasts with the
theoretical prediction of the property rights model developed by Hart (1995),
is that joint ownership is the most eﬃcient ownership structure. The superi-
ority of joint ownership in the experimental setting can be explained by the
fact that it makes better use of fairness as an enforcement device than alter-
native ownership structures. Our paper looks at the extent to which power
imbalances between trade partners aﬀect relationship-speciﬁc investments.
Although some of the issues we are interested in are similar to those explored
in Fehr et al. (2008b), our experimental setup diﬀers markedly from theirs.
First, we employ a non-linear payoﬀ function instead of a linear one.
Players receive payoﬀs based on a Cobb-Douglas transformation of their in-
vestments into a physical asset. Investments are therefore complements at the
margin, and the equilibrium outcome is interior rather than on the boundary
3Another exception is the study by Fehr et al. (2008a) which provides experimental
evidence in line with the idea of Hart and Moore (2008) that competitively determined
contracts constitute a reference point for trading relationships.
4of the strategy space. Second, in our experiment players invest simultane-
ously while Fehr et al. (2008b) look at the case of sequential investments. Due
to the simultaneous-move design, the only asymmetry between players is due
to the asymmetric sharing rule. Hence, we minimize confounding behavioral
eﬀects such as trust or reciprocity. Third, we not only observe players’ invest-
ment strategies, but also players’ beliefs about their opponents’ investment
strategies. This allows us to learn more about the motives of the players.
A key ﬁnding of our incomplete contract experiment is that people tend
to disregard inequality, instead making investment choices that improve so-
cial welfare. Relatedly, Charness and Grosskopf (2001) present evidence that
most people in simple experimental games are prepared to make monetary
sacriﬁces to help other persons, but only few sacriﬁce money merely to
achieve equality of payoﬀs. Kritikos and Bolle (2001) show that participants
in binary-choice dictator games which allow for discrimination between diﬀer-
ent types of distributional concerns are eﬃciency rather than equity-oriented.
Finally, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) study simple one-shot distribution
experiments, showing that a combination of eﬃciency concerns, maximin
preferences, and selﬁshness can rationalize most of their data while inequal-
ity aversion cannot explain some important patterns. The results presented
here conﬁrm these ﬁndings, but in a new and diﬀerent context. In particu-
lar, ours is the ﬁrst study showing that concerns for social welfare are key
determinants of investment behavior in a world of costly contracting.
Our paper also makes contact with several other strands of the experi-
mental literature. Both our study and that by Fehr et al. (2008b) has been
preceded by a small experimental literature on hold-up problems. A hold-up
problem arises when part of the return on an agent’s relationship-speciﬁc
investment is expropriated by her trading partner in an ex-post process of
negotiation. In an early experiment, Hacket (1994) showed that agents who
invest relatively more tend to receive larger shares of ex-post surplus. The
fact that higher ex-ante investments are rewarded through more favorable ex-
post sharing agreements mitigates problems of underinvestment and hold-up,
a ﬁnding which is also at the heart of the study by Oosterbeek et al. (2003).
Gantner et al. (2001) study simple bargaining games with prior production.
Their key ﬁnding is a signiﬁcant correlation between a player’s input into the
production process and the output share she claims during the bargaining
process, which suggests that equity considerations matter in this context.
5The games we analyze also share some features with public good games,
which have been extensively explored in the laboratory. A common ﬁnding is
that people cooperate more than in the Nash equilibrium, although cooper-
ation decays during the experiment. Our symmetric partnership structure is
strongly reminiscent of non-linear public good games with interior Nash equi-
libria (for a review of the relevant experimental literature see Laury and Holt,
2008). The analogy is less evident when it comes to the asymmetric part-
nership setup; this treatment is evocative of a (partially) excludable public
good game, i.e., one player can exclude the other from enjoying part of the
public good.
The ﬁnal part of our experiment also bears some aspects of a gift-exchange
game. Fehr et al. (1998) ﬁnd that gift exchange actually works in the labo-
ratory, although it is not a subgame perfect equilibrium.
3 Implementation of the Experiment
3.1 Baseline Game and Experimental Design
Consider the following model. There are two agents, A and B. Each agent
i ∈ {A,B} owns Mi units of initial endowment of a private good. Agents
choose how to split Mi between their own consumption (xi) and investment in
a production process (Ii). The monetary value of the output produced by the
investments of A and B is given by Q(IA,IB) = ϑIα
AI
β
B, where ϑ > 0, α > 0
and β > 0 are productivity parameters. A sharing rule (or an allocation of
power) determines how the monetary value of output is split between the
agents. Let πA = π be the share that goes to A, and let πB = 1 − π be
the share that goes to B. Each agent i maximizes a payoﬀ function of the
form Ui(IA,IB) = xi + πiQ(IA,IB) subject to the constraint Mi = xi + Ii.
Throughout the paper, we focus on environments in which the two agents
are symmetric in productive terms, i.e. α = β. For simplicity of notation, we
will only refer to α hereafter.
We report data from an experiment based on the above basic model.
The experiment was run at the University of Jena (Germany) in June and
July 2008and was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total
of 146 participants, recruited with Orsee (Greiner, 2004), took part in the
experiment. A translation of the instructions can be found in Appendix B.
6Conﬁguration SYM ASYM FLEX n
conﬂict (-C) SYM-C ASYM-C FLEX-C, choice between 8 sessions
ϑ = 24.83,α = 0.359 π = 0.491 π = 0.708 π = 0.491 and π = 0.708 70 participants
no conﬂict (-NC) SYM-NC ASYM-NC FLEX-NC, choice between 8 sessions
ϑ = 14,α = 0.41 π = 0.483 π = 0.748 π = 0.483 and π = 0.748 76 participants
Table 1: List of experimental treatments
Table 1 is useful in explaining the general structure of the experiment.
Participants were assigned to one of our two conﬁgurations: conﬂict and
no conﬂict. Within each conﬁguration, participants experience three types of
treatments: an asymmetric contract (ASYM), a symmetric contract (SYM)
and a ﬂexible contract (FLEX). In ASYM and SYM, the sharing rule used to
divide the beneﬁts from joint production is exogenously ﬁxed. We will refer
to these two conﬁgurations as ﬁxed contracts. ASYM and SYM represent
exempliﬁcations of situations characterized by power balance and imbalance
respectively. In FLEX participants can choose either a symmetric or an
asymmetric contract. If, in FLEX, both participants choose the same sharing
rule then this rule is adopted. In case of disagreement the asymmetric rule
ASYM is used as the default rule. The FLEX treatment allows to analyze
whether participants want to switch from an asymmetric to a symmetric
power structure.
At the beginning of each session we decided randomly whether partic-
ipants would ﬁrst play 10 rounds of ASYM (this happened in 7 sessions)
and then 10 rounds of SYM, or whether to use the opposite sequence (this
happened in 9 sessions). After having experienced 10 rounds of SYM and
10 rounds of ASYM participants played 10 rounds of FLEX.4 Participants
were rematched randomly after each round. Although diﬀerent parameters
(ϑ and α) and sharing rules are employed in conﬂict and no conﬂict, equi-
librium predictions for the two conﬁgurations diﬀer mainly in the ﬂexible
contract treatment. With the conﬂict-parameters there is a conﬂict of in-
terest between the two players: in FLEX-C the selﬁsh A-players prefer the
asymmetric contract while B-players prefer the symmetric contract. With
the no conﬂict-parameters this is not the case: in FLEX-NC both types of
players, A and B, prefer the symmetric contract. We will explain this in
more detail when illustrating this treatment. When discussing asymmetric
4In one session of the experiment we played 12 and not 10 rounds of each contract.
7contracts, we will refer to type A players as strong and to type B players as
weak. We now turn to a more detailed description of the experiment.
3.2 Fixed Contracts
In each treatment, players simultaneously invest into joint production under
either symmetric or asymmetric sharing rules. Under symmetric sharing rules
(πSY M is 0.491 or 0.483), each player is entitled to an almost equal share of
the total monetary output. Under asymmetric sharing rules (πASY M is 0.708
or 0.748), the strong player receives a substantially larger portion of the total
output. In our experiment, players choose integer investment numbers only
(multiples of 50 from 0 to 500) and derive their payoﬀs from payoﬀ tables
(see table 2 for an example). The parameter values (ϑ and α) used in our
treatments are given in Table 1. Mi is always 500. Payoﬀs in the experiment
are rounded to integers. Furthermore, in the experiment the values of the
investments (0 to 500) are replaced by consecutive numbers (1 to 11).
Discretizing a continuous problem and presenting it with the help of payoﬀ
tables has both advantages and disadvantages. A key advantage is that it
allows us to elicit players’ expectations in a natural way. In each round of the
experiment, players are asked to click on a row they might want to choose
and on a column they think their opponents might select. These rows and
columns and their intersection are then highlighted on the computer screen.
Participants can experiment by clicking on rows and columns as often as they
want until they are satisﬁed with their choices and expectations. Only when
a participant clicks on an “OK” button does she proceed to the result stage
of the round. This feature not only allows us to check for the consistency of
players’ expectations and behavior, but it also promotes a more thoughtful
decision-making process. Table 2 presents an example of a decision screen in
the experiment.
The disadvantage of discretizing a continuous problem is that it quickly
leads to a large number of equilibria. If we want to have a clear equilibrium
prediction, and still present payoﬀs in the form of tables, then we have to
live with a parameter space that is considerably restricted. In particular, we
can only use values of π which are bounded away from 1/2. Hence, when we
call a sharing rule“symmetric”then this is only an approximation; π = 0.491
and π = 0.483 are as close as we can get to 1/2.
We illustrate the best reply functions for ASYM and SYM, under either













































































































































































































































































In this example a participant has clicked on “3” in the left column to indicate her own
choice. As a result the corresponding row is shown in red. She has also clicked on “9” in
the top row to indicate her expectations about the choice of the other player. As a result
this column is shown in red and the intersecting pair of payoﬀs is highlighted with a blue
circle. The participant can now click on the OK-button to continue to the next stage. She
can also wait and adjust her choices and expectations. Own payoﬀs are shown in boldface
in the bottom left part of each cell of the table, the other payoﬀs are shown in a smaller
font in the top right part.
Table 2: An example of a decision screen in the experiment
SYM-C ASYM-C
































π = 0.491, ϑ = 24.83, α = 0.359
































π = 0.708, ϑ = 24.83, α = 0.359
Figure 1: Best reply functions in SYM-C and ASYM-C with conﬂict
9SYM-NC ASYM-NC
































π = 0.483, ϑ = 14, α = 0.41
































π = 0.748, ϑ = 14, α = 0.41
Figure 2: Best reply functions in SYM-NC and ASYM-NC with no conﬂict
conﬂict or no conﬂict, in Figures 1 and 2, assuming that individuals are
motivated purely by self-interest. For each situation there is an interior Nash
equilibrium in which both players invest part of their endowment into joint
production; there is also an equilibrium in which both players invest zero.
We note that no sharing rule induces ﬁrst best investments. Intuitively,
this is because players do not capture the full marginal returns on their
investments. As a consequence, equilibrium investment levels are ineﬃciently
low. However, some sharing rules provide better investment incentives than
others. In particular, if participants in the experiment are motivated by self-
interest and select interior equilibria, then asymmetric sharing rules lead to
lower aggregate investments than symmetric sharing rules.5
We now turn our attention to payoﬀ distributions. If players follow stan-
dard equilibrium predictions and select interior equilibria, then asymmetric
sharing rules not only imply lower aggregate investments, but also unequal
payoﬀ distributions. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the convex
hull of the feasible payoﬀ pairs for both treatments, under either conﬂict or
5Theoretically, if players simultaneously choose IA and IB to respectively maximize
MA − IA + πϑIα
AI
β
B and MB − IB + (1 − π)ϑIα
AI
β
B, then the sharing rule that maximizes









If players are symmetric in productive terms (a = b), then ϕ = 1 and the optimal sharing
rule is π = 1/2.
10SYM-C and ASYM-C SYM-NC and ASYM-NC






























Nash ASYM Nash SYM
Nash SYM
πSYM = 0.491, πASYM = 0.708, ϑ = 24.83, α = 0.359
SYM−C
ASYM−C






























Nash ASYM Nash SYM
Nash SYM
πSYM = 0.483, πASYM = 0.748, ϑ = 14, α = 0.41
SYM−NC
ASYM−NC
Figure 3: Convex hull of payoﬀ possibilities
no conﬂict. The dashed line marks the set of all payoﬀ combinations that can
be obtained with asymmetric sharing rules. The solid line shows the set of
all payoﬀ combinations that can be achieved with symmetric sharing rules.
Equilibrium payoﬀ pairs implied by asymmetric sharing rules are marked
with a “+”, while those implied by symmetric sharing rules are marked with
a “◦”. If players choose interior equilibria then ASYM sharing rules give rise
to rather large payoﬀ diﬀerences. The interior equilibrium payoﬀs of type A
players exceed those of type B players by about 36% in conﬂict and 43% in
no conﬂict. For the sharing rules that we call SYM there is still a deviation,
but it is much smaller: 2% in conﬂict and 6% in no conﬂict.
3.3 Flexible Contracts
After having played the ﬁxed contract game with 10 rounds of SYM and 10
rounds of ASYM sharing rules, in FLEX players can choose between ASYM
and SYM. The default rule is always ASYM. If both players prefer the same
contract (either SYM or ASYM), then this contract is implemented; if players
disagree, then the status quo contract ASYM is used. We use the strategy
method and ask players in each period whether they prefer SYM or ASYM
and, simultaneously, which investment they would choose under ASYM and
under SYM. When both players have made their choice we reveal the chosen
contract, investments and payoﬀs.
Which contracts should players choose? In Figure 3 we notice that in
11both conditions, conﬂict and no conﬂict, a weak (B) player prefers SYM
over ASYM in equilibrium. Intuitively, this is because both total investments
and the weak player’s share increase from ASYM to SYM. For the strong (A)
player the situation is diﬀerent: On the one hand, an agreement to implement
a more equitable sharing rule reduces a strong (A) player’s share of the total
surplus (“surplus division eﬀect”). On the other hand, such an agreement
induces the weak (B) player to invest more into joint production (“investment
eﬀect”). Under conﬂict, the surplus division eﬀect dominates the investment
eﬀect, and so it is rational for a strong (A) player to veto the implementation
of a more equitable sharing rule. Under no conﬂict, the investment eﬀect
dominates the surplus division eﬀect, and hence it is rational for a strong
(A) player to give up her power in favor of a symmetric sharing rule.
4 Behavioral Predictions
Our discussion and predictions so far are based on the assumption of common
knowledge of rationality and selﬁshness of all players. However, experimental
evidence suggests that not all individuals simply maximize monetary payoﬀs.
Two features of our basic model make it conceivable that behavioral motives
might enter players’ investment decisions:
The allocation under standard equilibrium predictions is ineﬃcient and
unequal. Players might therefore be concerned about social eﬃciency or
reveal an aversion towards inequality. In this section we will show that these
diﬀerent types of social preferences call for quite diﬀerent investment choices.
To generate behavioral predictions we follow a model of social preferences
as proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002). While the players in our exper-
iment choose integer investment numbers only, it is instructive to generate
behavioral predictions based on the continuous choice problem underlying
the experiment. Letting
UA(IA,IB) = M−IA+πϑ(IAIB)
α and UB(IA,IB) = M−IB+(1−π)ϑ(IAIB)
α
(1)
denote player A’s and B’s monetary payoﬀs, we suppose that players’ pref-
erences are given by:
VA(IA,IB) = (ρ   r + σ   s)   UB(IA,IB) + (1 − ρ   r − σ   s)   UA(IA,IB) (2)
12and
VB(IA,IB) = (ρ   s + σ   r)   UA(IA,IB) + (1 − ρ   s − σ   r)   UB(IA,IB) (3)
where r = 1 and s = 0 if UA( ) > UB( ), r = 0 and s = 1 if UA( ) < UB( ),
and r = 0 and s = 0 if UA( ) = UB( ). This is basically the model of
Charness and Rabin (2002), except that, in this simultaneous move game,
we leave out the term for reciprocity. The parameters ρ and σ allow for a
range of diﬀerent“distributional preferences”. We focus here on“competitive
preferences”, “diﬀerence-averse preferences” and “social-welfare preferences”.
Competitive preferences correspond to σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0, meaning that each player
prefers to do as well as possible in comparison to her opponent, while also
caring directly about her own payoﬀ. Models of inequity (diﬀerence) aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) assume that people
prefer to minimize disparities between their own payoﬀs and those of other
people. Inequity aversion corresponds to σ < −ρ < 0. That is, people suﬀer
utility losses from both disadvantageous and advantageous payoﬀ disparities,
but suﬀer more from disparities that are to their disadvantage. By contrast,
the notion of social-welfare preferences captures the idea that individuals
prefer higher payoﬀs for themselves and for other persons, but are more con-
cerned about own payoﬀs when they are disadvantaged compared to others
(Charness and Rabin, 2002). Concerns for social-welfare can be represented
by assuming that 1 > ρ > σ > 0. We now explain how these three dif-
ferent forms of distributional preferences would theoretically aﬀect players’
incentives to invest into joint production.
Suppose that the sharing rule used to divide output is exogenous. As
a benchmark, consider the equilibrium investments under the assumption
of selﬁshness of all players. In this case, the investments IA and IB are
chosen simultaneously and non-cooperatively to maximize UA(IA,IB) and
UA(IA,IB), respectively.6 We have:
Proposition 1 If the participants exhibit self-interested preferences (r = s =
0), then there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in
















6In the discussion to follow, we will ignore the existence of an equilibrium in which
both players invest zero.
13Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We next consider how distributional concerns would alter the players’
investment incentives. As we will demonstrate below, the equilibrium invest-
ments of individuals with distributional preferences depend on the degree
of asymmetry in the sharing rule π. Without loss of generality, we restrict
our attention to parameter values satisfying π ≥ 1/2, i.e., the case in which
any asymmetry in the sharing rule favors player A and discriminates against
player B. For algebraic convenience, deﬁne
κA =
(1 − ρ)π + ρ(1 − π)
1 − ρ
and γB =








We have the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose that players exhibit distributional preferences (r  = 0
and s  = 0). Assume π ≥ 1/2 and deﬁne:
π =
 
1 +  
where   =
(1 − σ)[(1 − α)(1 − ρ) + ρα]
(1 − ρ)[(1 − α)((1 − σ) + σα]
> 1.7 (7)
(a) If the sharing rule π is suﬃciently bounded away from one-half, π ∈
[π,1), then there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium in pure
















(b) If the sharing rule π is suﬃciently close to one-half, π ∈ [1/2,π),
then there exists a closed set of Pareto-rankable Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. In the most eﬃcient equilibrium the players’ investment lev-













In the least eﬃcient equilibrium the players’ investment levels are given
7That we have µ > 1 follows from the assumption of our distributional model that
ρ > σ. Note that this assumption is satisiﬁed irrespective of whether one is interested in














Proof. See Appendix A.2.8
If the sharing rule used to divide output is suﬃciently asymmetric, then
the players’ best response functions are well behaved and a unique equilibrium
in pure strategies exists [part (a) of the proposition]. Conversely, if the
sharing rule used to divide output is suﬃciently close to one-half, then there
exists a set of Pareto-rankable Nash equilibria in pure strategies [part (b) of
the proposition]. In each equilibrium, the investments chosen by A and B
lead to an equalization of their respective payoﬀs.
In order to generate behavioral predictions, we now contrast the invest-
ment incentives of self-interested players with those of individuals who are
either inequity-averse or care about social welfare. In so doing, we focus
purely on the parameters used in our experiment. We use the term simulta-
neous overinvestment to describe a situation in which the investments chosen
by both players exceed those of self-interested individuals. Similarly, the no-
tion simultaneous underinvestment denotes outcomes in which both players
choose investment levels that are lower than those chosen by their selﬁsh
counterparts. For sharing rules that are bounded away from one-half, we
have:
Prediction 1 (Asymmetric Sharing Rules) If the sharing rule used to di-
vide output is asymmetric (π = 0.708 in ASYM-C and π = 0.748 in ASYM-
NC) then:
(a) If players are motivated by inequity aversion (σ < −ρ < 0) or have
competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then there is simultaneous
underinvestment in equilibrium.
(b) If players are concerned about social-welfare (1 ≥ ρ ≥ σ > 0), then
there is simultaneous overinvestment in equilibrium.
8For the sake of simplicity, the proposition establishes all possible equilibrium conﬁg-
urations for the case in which γB is strictly positive. This requires that σ > ˆ σ, where
ˆ σ = − 1−π
2π−1. All behavioral predictions that are to follow continue to hold in the case
where σ ≤ ˆ σ. A detailed proof is contained in Appendix A.
15Proof. See Appendix A.3.
These results are driven by the complementarity in our investment game.
Suppose both players display inequity aversion and consider the self-interest
Nash equilibrium prediction as a starting point.9 The only way a player of
type B can reduce payoﬀ diﬀerences is by decreasing her investment; knowing
this, and given that A is less concerned than B about inequality (σ < −ρ <
0), A’s best reply is to also lower her investment. The iteration of this
kind of reasoning results in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium with respect to the
Nash prediction based on self-interested players. Now consider players who
display social-welfare preferences. Then player A has an incentive to raise
her investment, with respect to the rational Nash equilibrium, thus increasing
joint payoﬀs while keeping ahead of her opponent. Knowing this, B’s best
reply is to raise her investment as well, thus provoking an even higher increase
in A’s choice which augments her own payoﬀ. This leads to an equilibrium
that Pareto-dominates the self-interest Nash prediction.
The above discussion assumes that the sharing rule used to divide output
is suﬃciently asymmetric. For sharing rules that are close to one-half, we
have the following:
Prediction 2 (Symmetric Sharing Rules) If the sharing rule used to divide
output is close to one-half (π = 0.491 in SYM-C and π = 0.483 in SYM-NC)
then:
(a) If players have competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then there is
simultaneous underinvestment in equilibrium.
(b) If players are motivated by inequity aversion (σ < −ρ < 0), then there
can be simultaneous underinvestment and simultaneous overinvestment
in equilibrium.
(c) If players are concerned about social-welfare (1 ≥ ρ ≥ σ > 0), then
there is simultaneous overinvestment in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
While our theoretical predictions are derived from the continuous choice
problem that underlies our experiment, they carry over to the discrete invest-
ment game that our players face in the laboratory. Assuming that players
9Similar points hold when individuals exhibit competitive preferences.
16Simultaneous underinvestment (1) Simultaneous overinvestment (2)
Parameter values Consistent with Parameter values Consistent with
Asymmetric sharing rules
ASYM-C (π = 0.708) σ < −0.05, ρ < 0.38 IA and CP σ > 0.03, ρ > −0.11 CSW
ASYM-NC (π = 0.748) σ < −0.03, ρ < 0.46 IA and CP σ > 0.02, ρ > −0.20 CSW
Symmetric sharing rules
SYM-C (π = 0.491) σ < −0.51   ρ − 0.06 IA and CP σ > 0.02 − 1.2   ρ IA and CSW
SYM-NC (π = 0.483) σ < 0.05, ρ < −0.01 CP σ > 0.02, ρ > −0.05 CSW
IA=inequity aversion; CSW=concern for social welfare; CP=competitive preferences.
Table 3: Behavioral Predictions
ranges of ranges consistent with ranges consistent with



















































IA=inequity aversion; CSW=concern for social welfare; CP=competitive preferences.
Figure 4: Behavioral Predictions — Illustration of Table 3
have distributional preferences, Table 3 gives necessary conditions on σ and
ρ for the existence of an equilibrium in our discrete choice experiment in
which both A and B either underinvest (column 1) or overinvest (column 2)
compared to self-interested individuals. Figure 4 illustrates the table.
With the help of these conditions we can now relate behavior in the
experiment to preferences. In all four treatments simultaneous overinvest-
ment as an equilibrium outcome is consistent with concerns for social wel-
fare. Conversely, simultaneous underinvestment as an equilibrium outcome
is consistent with either a competitive preference or an intrinsic preference
to minimize diﬀerences in payoﬀs.
Overall, our investment game with asymmetric sharing rules allows us to
disentangle social-welfare concerns from inequality aversion and competitive
preferences. Diﬀerently from numerous other experiments in which a Pareto-
improvement also decreases inequality10, in our case the only way equally












































































































Figure 5: Distribution of investments under Fixed Contracts
inequality averse players can lower payoﬀ diﬀerences in equilibrium is by
investing even less eﬃciently than selﬁsh individuals. On the other hand, if
players are equally concerned about social-welfare they will in equilibrium
raise their investment compared to self-interested players.
5 Results
We now turn to a detailed examination of the experimental data. We consider
investment choices under ﬁxed contracts in Section 5.1, discuss the consis-
tency of expectations and behavior in Section 5.2, and examine the eﬀects of
endogenizing sharing rules in Section 5.3.
5.1 Fixed Contracts
We begin by examining investment choices when contracts are ﬁxed. In
so doing, we exploit the data collected during treatments ASYM and SYM
for both conﬁgurations conﬂict and no conﬂict. As we mentioned earlier, if
players follow standard equilibrium predictions, then no sharing rule would
induce ﬁrst best investments. However, symmetric sharing rules are predicted
to provide better aggregate investment incentives than asymmetric sharing
rules. This prediction is conﬁrmed by our results. Figure 5 shows the cumu-
lative distribution of investments in both treatments under conﬂict and no
conﬂict respectively. Under both conﬁgurations we observe that aggregate

















Notches extend to ±1.58IQR/
√
n and indicate a 95% conf. interval for the diﬀerence in
two medians (see Chambers et al., 1983).
Figure 6: Average investments (over Nash investment) per player
investments are substantially lower in ASYM, i.e. when one individual ap-
propriates a large portion of the total beneﬁts accruing from the partnership.
This conﬁrms one of the central insights of the modern property rights ap-
proach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), namely that the
allocation of power in partnerships is important for investment incentives.
We record this in the following.
Result 1 Aggregate investments are higher under symmetric sharing rules
than under asymmetric sharing rules.
The key issue motivating our experiment lies in understanding the be-
havioral motives that enter partners’ investment behavior under symmetric
and asymmetric power structures. To get at this issue, we now compare
investment behavior in the experiment with equilibrium investments of self-
ish players. Figure 6 shows the diﬀerence between average investment and
Nash equilibrium investment for both players and both treatments (under
both parameter conﬁgurations) as a boxplot. Note that these diﬀerences are
fairly similar under conﬂict and no conﬂict. Both types of players invest
more than predicted by Nash equilibrium, although overinvestment is higher
among strong (A) players or with a symmetric sharing rule. 11
11As previously mentioned, our SYM treatment is similar to a non-linear public good
game with an interior equilibrium. A prominent experiment in this area is the study by
19β σ t p value 95% conf interval pmvd
1 0.777 0.235 3.31 0.0010 0.316 1.24
dSY M 1.65 0.0904 18.3 0.0000 1.47 1.83 0.845
dstrong 0.817 0.104 7.83 0.0000 0.612 1.02 0.155
Table 4: Mixed eﬀects estimation of equation 11 for no conﬂict
β σ t p value 95% conf interval pmvd
1 0.522 0.182 2.88 0.0040 0.166 0.878
dSY M 0.963 0.0611 15.8 0.0000 0.843 1.08 0.351
dstrong 1.51 0.0705 21.4 0.0000 1.37 1.65 0.649
Table 5: Mixed eﬀects estimation of equation 11 for conﬂict
We can provide a more formal analysis of the behavioral patterns observed
in Figure 6. To do so, we call Iij the investment of player i in period j during
a given treatment (either SYM or ASYM). Moreover, let IN be the respective
Nash equilibrium investment levels. We then estimate the following equation:
¯ I − I
N = β1 + βSY M   dSY M + βstrong   dstrong + us + uij (11)
Sessions are indexed with s, players are indexed with i, and diﬀerent periods
have the index j. To simplify the notation we do not write indices ij for
variables. Throughout the paper and unless speciﬁed otherwise we estimate
mixed eﬀects models with a random eﬀect for session us where we assume
that error terms us and uij follow a normal distribution with mean zero.
The dummy variable dSY M is one for symmetric power sharing and zero
otherwise, dstrong is one for the strong player (A) under asymmetric sharing
rules and zero otherwise. The reference group is, hence, weak players (B)
under asymmetric power sharing. We estimate equation (11) separately for
conﬂict and no conﬂict. Results are shown in Tables 5 and 4.
To assess the impact of coeﬃcients on the variance of our dependent vari-
able we use as a measure of relative importance the proportional marginal
value decomposition (pmvd) as proposed by Feldman (2005) using the imple-
mentation of Gr¨ omping (2007). Other measures of relative importance (such
as lmr) yield similar results.
Isaac and Walker (1998), who analyze the eﬀect of the location of the aggregate Nash
equilibrium in the strategy space. In line with their ﬁndings, we observe that investments
are closer to Nash equilibrium when the latter is closer to eﬃciency, i.e., overinvestment
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The tables show for the diﬀerent treatments the frequency of pairs of choices where players’
investments were smaller (<), equal (=), or larger (>) than Nash equilibrium investments.
Table 6: Frequencies of choices
Result 2 (a) Under both symmetric and asymmetric sharing rules, strong
(A) and weak (B) players overinvest on average.
(b) With ASYM, strong (A) players overinvest more than weak (B) players.
(c) With SYM, players invest more than weak (B) players under ASYM.
The ﬁrst part of this result follows from the positive coeﬃcients in Tables 5
and 4. The second and third parts are implied by a positive βstrong and a
positive βSY M, respectively.
The above discussion indicates that players’ investments deviate from
equilibrium investments of selﬁsh players. We now check whether distribu-
tional preferences can explain our observations. More precisely, in light of the
predictions we formulated in Section 4, we want to explore whether players’
behavior is consistent with either inequity aversion, social welfare or com-
petitive preferences. Table 5.1 shows frequencies of pairs of investments that
were smaller, equal or larger than Nash equilibrium. We see that in all cases
the majority of pairs simultaneously invests more than Nash equilibrium.
Recall from Prediction 1 that inequity averse players would not simul-
taneously overinvest under ASYM. The observed behavior is consistent not
with inequity aversion but with social welfare preferences.
Result 3 Players’ behavior is consistent with social welfare preferences,
while it cannot be explained by either inequality aversion or competitive pref-
erences.
21ASYM-C ASYM-NC
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Sizes (areas) of the circles are proportional to empirical frequencies. The shaded area is
the convex hull of possible payoﬀs.
Figure 7: Payoﬀ distributions under asymmetric sharing rules
As a consequence of the simultaneous overinvestment of both players, in
the majority of cases social welfare increases. Interestingly, this comes with
an increase in inequality Figure 7 shows the distribution of payoﬀs for the
weak and for the strong player in ASYM. Sizes of the circles are propor-
tional to empirical frequencies. We clearly see that the actual allocations are
typically more eﬃcient than Nash equilibrium allocations. However, they of-
ten become even more unequal than the (already unequal) Nash equilibrium
allocation. For the ASYM treatments inequality in the experiment (mea-
sured as payoﬀ ratio) is 5.4% larger on average than inequality under the
Nash equilibrium.12 These results do support the general ﬁndings outlined
in Charness and Rabin (2002).
Result 4 When asymmetric sharing rules are employed, payoﬀ allocations
are typically more eﬃcient, but more unequal than the self-interest equilib-
rium allocation.
5.2 Expectations and Behavior
To better understand the results described above, we analyze players’ expec-
tations in the ﬁxed contract treatments. Figures 8 and 9 show the distribution
of choices and expectations for ASYM-C and SYM-C respectively. As in ﬁg-
12This is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a p-value of 2.5%.
22by player A by player B



















































































Sizes (areas) of the circles are proportional to empirical frequencies.
Figure 8: Distribution of choices and expectations in ASYM-C
ure 7 sizes of circles are proportional to frequencies. The ﬁgures also include
the best reply functions as already shown in Figure 1.13
Let us start with the left hand graph in Figure 8. This graph shows
choices and expectations of type A players, i.e. players who get a share of
π = 0.708. With selﬁsh players equilibrium choices and expectations would
be given by the intersection of the two best reply curves, i.e. the point marked
“Nash”in the graph. While some choices and expectations are consistent with
this point, a peak of the distribution can be found at point R. This point
describes a situation where a type A player expects an investment of 4 by the
opponent (i.e. more than equilibrium) and chooses a best reply (i.e. 7). A
second peak of the distribution can be found at point S. Here expectations
of the type A player are the same as in point R (a moderate overinvestment
of the type B player), however A’s choice is full investment.
The right hand graph in Figure 8 shows choices and expectations of type
B players. These choices and expectations are surprisingly consistent with
those of player A. The only exception is type B players expects type A players
to invest slightly more than what type A players actually do.
It is interesting to note that these expectations, and subsequent choices,
are consistent with the equilibrium prediction when players display concerns
for social welfare. Strong players invest well above the self-interest Nash equi-
13As best reply functions are closer to each other under no conﬂict, the relative ﬁgures
are less instructive and we do not show them for the sake of brevity
23by player A by player B
































































Sizes (areas) of the circles are proportional to empirical frequencies.
Figure 9: Distribution of choices and expectations in SYM-C
librium level, and expect a slight overinvestment of their weak opponents. On
the other hand, weak players expect their opponents to choose investments
above the self-interest Nash equilibrium, and reply by slightly overinvesting,
even though not as much as their opponents.
Figure 9 refers to the symmetric contract. We can see that a large part of
players expect their opponents to invest more than Nash equilibrium and best
reply accordingly by overinvesting. As in the asymmetric case, this pattern
is also consistent with the hypothesis that individuals display social welfare
preferences.
Result 5 Players’ expectations of their partners’ choices are generally con-
sistent with the actual investments undertaken. Furthermore, players’ expec-
tations, and their consequent choices, are compatible with the hypothesis of
social welfare preferences.
5.3 Flexible contracts
The last part of the experiment is the situation FLEX where players can
choose what kind of sharing rule to adopt. Figure 10 reports the distribution
of votes for the symmetric contract over time, under either parameter con-
ﬁguration. Players are clearly guided by the rational equilibrium prediction.
B players, who in equilibrium beneﬁt from the symmetric contract both in
FLEX-C and FLEX-NC, almost always vote in favor of this sharing rule.
24conﬂict, FLEX-C no conﬂict, FLEX-NC






















































Figure 10: Fraction of votes for SYM
A players, who in equilibrium beneﬁt from the symmetric contract only in
FLEX-NC, support the equal division under this conﬁguration much more
often than in FLEX-C.
Result 6 Weak players almost always vote in favor of symmetric sharing
rules. Strong players agree to share power much more often in FLEX-NC
than in FLEX-C. This pattern is consistent with standard game theoretical
predictions.
While, theoretically, SYM yields smaller payoﬀs than ASYM in FLEX-C,
nevertheless, about 66 % of strong players vote in favor of SYM at least once.
Why is this? Recall that before playing FLEX, players had experienced both
SYM and ASYM. Figure 11 shows the distribution of average payoﬀs players
experienced in these stages. In the no conﬂict treatment A players should
theoretically expect higher payoﬀs with SYM than with ASYM. Indeed, this
is the case for 76% of all A players. In the conﬂict treatment A players should
theoretically expect smaller payoﬀs with SYM than with ASYM (and, hence,
vote against). However, 43% of the A players experienced larger payoﬀs with
SYM than with ASYM.
This is not least a consequence of the social welfare preferences exhibited
by B players which led to overinvestment under SYM. A players, who made
a good experience with SYM in the ﬁrst part of the game, are likely to vote
for SYM when they can. These players are willing to invest more than the
25average payoﬀs, player A average payoﬀs, player B




































































Figure 11: Average payoﬀs in SYM and ASYM
β σ z p value 95% conf interval
1 -1.83 0.939 -1.95 0.0508 -3.67 0.00645
r 2.64 0.863 3.05 0.0023 0.945 4.33
dconﬂ. -1.06 0.366 -2.89 0.0038 -1.77 -0.342
Table 7: Mixed eﬀects estimation of equation 12 for player A
rational Nash level and, at the same time, expect to be rewarded by their
partners’ higher investments.
To test this more formally, we estimate a mixed eﬀects probit model.
P(SY M) = Φ(β1 + βr   r + βconﬂ.   dconﬂ. + us) (12)
We call r the ratio of payoﬀs r = ¯ πSY M/¯ πASY M which was experienced in
the previous stages of the game. The dummy dconﬂ. is one in conﬂict and
zero in no conﬂict. We include a noise term for session us. Φ is the standard
normal distribution. Results are shown in table 7. As we should expect the
coeﬃcient of r is positive and signiﬁcant: the larger the relative proﬁts under
SYM in the ﬁrst stage of the game are, the higher the probability that an A
player votes in the FLEX stage for SYM. Also not surprising, the coeﬃcient
of dconﬂ. is negative and signiﬁcant: the general inclination to vote for SYM
is smaller in the conﬂict condition.
The above interpretation is supported by the following ﬁnding. Figure
12 shows the investments of the strong player depending on the choice of
contract (since almost all weak players choose the symmetric contract we





























The ﬁgure shows the diﬀerence between actual and Nash investment for player A depending
on player A’s vote and depending on the actual contract (ASYM or SYM). In this ﬁgure we
pool data from conﬂict and no conﬂict. Notches indicate 95% intervals for the diﬀerence
in two medians (see ﬁgure 6).
Figure 12: Investments and votes of player A
focus on player A). We see that those players A who vote for a symmetric
contract always invest signiﬁcantly more then those who do not: investment
levels are higher both under the ASYM and SYM regime.
Result 7 In FLEX-C, the majority of strong (A) players agree to give up
their power at least once. Strong players who vote in favor of SYM invest
more than those who vote against, both in FLEX-C and FLEX-NC.
For a formal analysis we estimate Equation 13 for the strong player (A)
(for the FLEX treatment where players can choose a contract).
Ii,t − I
N = β0 + βSYMvote   dSYMvote + βSY M   dSY M + us + uij (13)
Again we estimate a mixed eﬀects model with a random eﬀect for session
us. Estimation results are shown in Tables 9 and 8. The estimation results
conﬁrm what we see in Figure 12. Let us ﬁrst look at the estimation for
conﬂict in Table 9. As we have seen in ﬁgure 10, not all strong players
cast a fair vote here. However, those how do make also signiﬁcantly higher
investments than those who do not.
The same holds for no conﬂict as shown in Table 8. There, however,
the eﬀect is much smaller and explains a smaller part of the variance. We
27β σ t p value 95% conf interval pmvd
1 0.876 0.296 2.96 0.0032 0.294 1.46
dSYMvote 1.15 0.162 7.08 0.0000 0.83 1.47 0.627
dSY M 0.857 0.136 6.31 0.0000 0.591 1.12 0.373
Table 8: Mixed eﬀects estimation of equation 13 for player A, no conﬂict
β σ t p value 95% conf interval pmvd
1 1.65 0.301 5.48 0.0000 1.06 2.24
dSYMvote 0.252 0.139 1.81 0.0710 -0.0215 0.525 0.495
dSY M -0.668 0.104 -6.45 0.0000 -0.871 -0.464 0.505
Table 9: Mixed eﬀects estimation of equation 13 for player A, conﬂict
should keep in mind that in no conﬂict it is in the own interest of the strong
players to move to a power sharing rule. Casting a fair vote is not a sign of a
particularly other regarding preference. Hence, there is no reason to expect
a speciﬁc altruistic behavior of these players.
6 Conclusion
The seminal works of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
have shed light on the central role played by property rights when contracts
are incomplete, describing their eﬀect on parties’ incentives to undertake
relationship-speciﬁc investments. Property rights can be looked at as an ab-
stract exempliﬁcation of the way power is allocated between parties. Indeed,
partnerships can be characterized by their power structure, and it is very
common to observe partnerships in which one party holds more power than
another. In this paper, we explored experimentally the extent to which dif-
ferent power structures aﬀect incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ments when contracts are incomplete. Despite the great attention devoted to
incomplete contracts in recent years, only a limited amount of experimental
evidence has been produced so far. Furthermore, to the best of our knowl-
edge, our study represents the ﬁrst attempt to analyze the eﬀect of power
structure in incomplete contracts.
We considered two equally productive players who simultaneously decide
how much to invest into a joint production process. We ﬁrst analyzed the
28players’ investment behavior when the power structure is exogenously im-
posed. As the players’ productivity is the same, theory predicts that total
investments would be lower in the presence of power imbalances and higher
when power is equally shared. This result is conﬁrmed by our experimental
evidence. However, we observed signiﬁcant overinvestment, with respect to
the self-interest Nash prediction, both under symmetric and asymmetric con-
ditions. With asymmetric sharing rules both types of players, even the weak
one, invest more than predicted by Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, overin-
vestment is higher among strong players. To better understand these results,
we examined the players’ expectations of their partners’ choices. These are
surprisingly consistent with the actual investments undertaken.
As standard game theoretical analysis fails to explain the players’ in-
vestment choices, we explored the predictions and implications of diﬀerent
behavioral theories, namely: inequity aversion, social welfare and competitive
preferences. Diﬀerently from several other experiments, our design allows us
to disentangle the eﬀect that diﬀerent social preferences have over individual
investment behavior. We showed that players’ behavior is consistent with
the hypothesis that individuals are concerned with social eﬃciency. Inter-
estingly, the player’s choices cannot be explained by either inequity aversion
or competitive preferences. This is an important result, which conﬁrms the
main ﬁndings of Charness and Rabin (2002).
Finally we examined situations where the power structure is ﬂexible.
Starting from a condition of asymmetry, the two players can agree to switch
to a symmetric sharing rule. If they disagree, the asymmetric contract is
applied. We analyzed this type of ﬂexible structure under two diﬀerent con-
ditions. In one, both players should rationally (and selﬁshly) agree to share
power equally. In the other, strong players should not give up power in
equilibrium. This prediction is qualitatively supported by our data. Indeed,
strong players choose to give up power much more often when it is rational to
do so. Nevertheless, we observe power-sharing agreements even when stan-
dard game theory predicts that the strong player should retain her power.
This ﬁnding can again be explained assuming that individuals display con-
cerns for social welfare.
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A Technical Appendix: Behavioral Predic-
tions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If players exhibit self-interested preferences, then each player i’s decision
problem is simply to choose Ii to maximize her material payoﬀ
Ui(IA,IB) = M − Ii + πiϑ(IiIj)
α (14)
where i ∈ {A,B} and i  = j. The Nash equilibrium investment levels of the
self-interest model, Is
A and Is









B = 1 (15)
The proposition follows immediately after solving these two equations for IA
and IB.
32A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Now consider the two players’ optimal choice of IA and IB when they have
social preferences, i.e., when their payoﬀs are given by
VA(IA,IB) = (ρ   r + σ   s)   UB(IA,IB) + (1 − ρ   r − σ   s)   UA(IA,IB) (16)
and
VB(IA,IB) = (ρ   s + σ   r)   UA(IA,IB) + (1 − ρ   s − σ   r)   UB(IA,IB) (17)
where r = 1 and s = 0 if UA( ) > UB( ), r = 0 and s = 1 if UA( ) < UA( ), and
r = 0 and s = 0 if UA( ) = UA( ). We do this in detail for the case where any
asymmetry in sharing rule favors player A and discriminates against player
B, i.e., we focus on parameter values satisfying π ≥ 1/2. We begin with
player A. Her best response function is shown in the ﬁrst panel of Figure 13
below. There, ˆ IA(IB) is the value of IA for which the material payoﬀs of the
two players are equal, i.e., ˆ IA(IB) implicitly solves









Notice that UA( ) > [<]UB( ) when IA < [>]ˆ IA(IB).
Also, I0







1−α where γA =











1−α where κA =
(1 − ρ)π + ρ(1 − π)
1 − ρ
. (20)
The intersection between ˆ IA(IB) and I0

















where ǫ = (2π − 1)/α. The intersection between ˆ IA(IB) and I1
A(IB) occurs













The bottom panel of Figure 13 shows player B’s best response function.
As before, ˆ IB(IA) is the value of IB for which the material payoﬀs of the
two players are equal, i.e., ˆ IB(IA) implicitly solves M − IA + πϑ(IAIB)α =
M −IB+(1−π)ϑ(IAIB)α, and UA( ) > [<]UB( ) when IA < [>]ˆ IA(IB). Also,
33I0







1−α where γB =











1−α where κB =
(1 − ρ)(1 − π) + ρπ
1 − ρ
. (24)
The intersection between ˆ IB(IA) and I0













The intersection between ˆ IA(IB) and I1

















We now note that for every player i, i ∈ {A,B},
Ii ≥ I
′
i and Ii ≤ I
′′




Moreover, it is readily checked that




1 +  
where   =
(1 − σ)[(1 − α)(1 − ρ) + ρα]
(1 − ρ)[(1 − α)((1 − σ) + σα]
> 1. (29)
With these preliminaries in hand, we now derive all possible equilibrium
equilibrium conﬁgurations of the investment game. Consider ﬁrst the case
where
γB =
(1 − σ)(1 − π) + σπ
1 − σ




It should be clear from Figure 13 that in the case under consideration, there
are two kinds of possible equilibrium conﬁgurations in the investment game.
The ﬁrst, illustrated in the top panel of Figure 14, occurs when π ∈ [1/2,π),
i.e., when the sharing rule used to divide output is suﬃciently close to one-
half. Then, Ii < Ii for every player i, and hence there exists a closed set
of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. All equilibria are located on the line
ˆ IB(IA) where the material payoﬀs of the two players are equal, i.e., in every
equilibrium the investments chosen by A and B lead to an equalization of
their material payoﬀs. Clearly, the equilibrium with the highest aggregate
34investment is determined by the intersection of ˆ IB(IA) and I1
A(IB) and there-
fore occurs at the point where (IA,IB) = (IA,IB). The equilibrium with
the lowest aggregate investment is determined by intersection of ˆ IB(IA) and
I0
B(IA) and therefore occurs at the point where (IA,IB) = (IA,IB).
The second kind of equilibrium, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 14,
occurs when π ∈ [π,1), i.e., when the sharing rule used to divide output is
suﬃciently bounded away from one-half. Then, Ii ≥ Ii for every player i. In
this case, there exists a unique interior pure-strategy equilibrium that has a
particularly simple form: it is determined by the intersection of I0
B(IA) and
I1





















It is readily checked that in this case γB ≤ 0 and γA − ǫ ≤ 0. As a re-
sult, for every player i, Ii = 0 and I′
i = 0. The best response functions of
player A is now ˆ IA(IB) if IA ≤ IA and I1
A(IB) if IA > IA. The best re-
sponse function of player B is ˆ IB(IA) if IB ≤ I′′
B and I1
B(IA) if IB > I′′
B. It
should now be clear that, irrespective of whether π ∈ [1/2,π) or π ∈ [π,1),
there now exists a closed set of equilibria in pure strategies (see Figure 15).
The equilibrium with the highest aggregate investment is determined by the
intersection of ˆ IB(IA) and I1
A(IB) and therefore occurs at the point where
(IA,IB) = (IA,IB). The equilibrium with the lowest aggregate investment
now occurs at the point where (IA,IB) = (0,0).
So, to summarize, the investment game is not always well behaved; we
cannot rule out multiple equilibria when the sharing rule used to divide out-
put is close to one-half. However, it is nevertheless possible to generate
behavioral predictions, conditional on the parameter conﬁgurations used in
the experiment.
A.3 Proof of Prediction 1
This result contrasts the investment incentives of self-interested players with
those of individuals who have social preferences under the assumption that
the sharing rule used to divide output is asymmetric (π = 0.708 in ASYM-C
and π = 0.748 in ASYM-NC). We now provide a proof of this result. In so
doing, we focus purely on the parameter conﬁgurations used in the experi-
ment. Moreover, we restrict our attention to parameter values satisfying and
ρ ≤ 1/2.
• Treatment ASYM-C (π = 0.708, α = 0.359, ϑ = 24.83): For the
parameter values under consideration, the equilibrium investment levels
35of self-interested individuals are given by
I
s
A = 222.62 and I
s
B = 91.82 (33)
Suppose now that individuals exhibit distributional preferences. Con-




≡ σ ⇒ σ > −0.702 (34)
The condition for the existence of a unique interior pure-strategy equi-
librium is
0.708 ≥
−(0.641 − 0.282ρ)(1 − σ)
0.923ρ − 0.564ρσ − 1.282 + 0.923σ
≡ π, (35)
which, given π = 0.708, is satisﬁed for all σ > −0.702 and ρ ≤ 0.5. In
the unique interior pure-strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium invest-





















Comparing (33) and (36), it is now readily checked that
– if individuals exhibit competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0) or in-
equity aversion (σ < −ρ < 0), then there is simultaneous under-





– if individuals are concerned about social welfare (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then










≡ σ ⇒ σ ≤ −0.702. (37)
This case is limited to competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0) and inequity
aversion (σ < −ρ < 0). For the parameter values under consideration,
there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which both parties
invest zero.14 Thus, our previous observation that competitive pref-
14To see this, recall that, when σ ≤ σ, there generally exists a closed set of pure-
strategy equilibria (see Figure 15). The equilibrium with the highest aggregate investments
occurs where (IA,IB) = (IA,IB). It is readily checked that, for the parameter values
under consideration, (IA,IB) = (0,0). Hence both parties will choose zero investments in
36erences or inequity aversion lead to simultaneous underinvestment in
equilibrium continues to hold.
• Treatment ASYM-NC (π = 0.748, α = 0.41, ϑ = 14): For the pa-
rameter values under consideration, the equilibrium investment levels
of self-interested individuals are given by
I
s
A = 275.03 and I
s
B = 92.66 (38)
Suppose now that individuals exhibit distributional preferences. Con-




≡ σ ⇒ σ > −0.508 (39)
The condition for the existence of a unique interior pure-strategy equi-
librium is
0.748 ≥
−(0.59 − 0.18ρ)(1 − σ)
0.77ρ − 0.36ρσ − 1.18 + 0.77σ
≡ π, (40)
which, given π = 0.748, is satisﬁed for all σ > −0.508 and ρ ≤ 0.5. In
the unique interior pure-strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium invest-






















Comparing (38) and (41), it is now readily checked that
– if individuals exhibit competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0) or in-
equity aversion (σ < −ρ < 0), then there is simultaneous under-





– if individuals are concerned about social welfare (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then










≡ σ ⇒ σ ≤ −0.702. (42)
This case only corresponds to competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0)
equilibrium.
37or inequity aversion (σ < −ρ < 0). As in ASYM-C, for the param-
eter values under consideration, there now exists a unique pure strat-
egy equilibrium in which both parties invest zero. Thus, our previous
observation that competitive preferences or inequity aversion lead to
simultaneous underinvestment in equilibrium continues to hold.
A.4 Proof of Prediction 2
This result contrasts the investment incentives of self-interested players with
those of individuals who have social preferences under the assumption that
the sharing rule used to divide output is symmetric (π = 0.491 in SYM-C
and π = 0.483 in SYM-NC). We now provide a proof of this result. As before,
we restrict our attention to parameter values satisfying and ρ ≤ 1/2.
• Treatment SYM-C (π = 0.491, α = 0.359, ϑ = 24.83): For the pa-
rameter values under consideration, the equilibrium investment levels
of self-interested individuals are given by
I
s
A = 196.56 and I
s
B = 203.77 (43)
Suppose now that individuals exhibit distributional preferences. Con-





≡ σ ⇒ σ > −27.28 (44)
and
0.491 ≤
(−0.641 − 0.282σ)(1 − ρ)
−1.282 + 0.923σ + 0.923ρ − 0.564ρσ
≡ 1 − ˆ π (45)
In the unique interior pure-strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium invest-






















Comparing (43) and (46), it is now readily checked that, when (44) and
(45) are satisﬁed, then
– if individuals exhibit competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then






38– if individuals exhibit inequity aversion (σ ≤ −ρ ≤ 0), then there
are two possible equilibrium outcomes. In the ﬁrst, there is si-





B. In the second, player B overinvests while player A





– if individuals are concerned about social welfare (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then






Consider next the case in which
0.491 >
(−0.641 − 0.282σ)(1 − ρ)
−1.282 + 0.923σ + 0.923ρ − 0.564ρσ
≡ 1 − ˆ π (47)
In this case, there exists a closed set of pure strategy equilibria. In
the equilibrium with the highest aggregate investments the players’
























In the equilibrium with the lowest aggregate investments the players’
























Comparing (43) with (48) and (49) respectively, it is now readily
checked that, when (47) is satisﬁed, then
– if individuals exhibit competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then
there is simultaneous underinvestment both in the equilibrium











– if individuals exhibit inequity aversion (σ ≤ −ρ ≤ 0), then there is












– if individuals are concerned about social welfare (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then
there is simultaneous overinvestment both in the equilibrium with
the highest aggregate investment (IA > Is
A and IB > Is
B) and in




• Treatment SYM-NC (π = 0.483, α = 0.41, ϑ = 14.00): For the pa-
rameter values under consideration, the equilibrium investment levels
of self-interested individuals are given by
I
s
A = 336.99 and I
s
B = 360.72 (50)
Suppose now that individuals exhibit distributional preferences. Con-





≡ σ ⇒ σ > −14.21 (51)
and
0.483 ≤
−(0.59 − 0.18σ)(1 − ρ)
(−1.18 + 0.77σ + 0.77ρ − 0.36ρσ)
≡ 1 − ˆ π (52)
In the unique interior pure-strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium invest-





















Comparing (50) and (53), it is now readily checked that, when (51) and
(52) are satisﬁed, then
– if individuals exhibit competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then






– if individuals exhibit inequity aversion (σ ≤ −ρ ≤ 0), then there
are three possible equilibrium outcomes. On the one hand, there










equilibrium. On the other hand, it may also be the case that






40– if individuals are concerned about social welfare (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then






Consider next the case in which
0.483 >
−(0.59 − 0.18σ)(1 − ρ)
(−1.18 + 0.77σ + 0.77ρ − 0.36ρσ)
≡ 1 − ˆ π (54)
In this case, there exists a closed set of pure strategy equilibria. In
the equilibrium with the highest aggregate investments the players’
























In the equilibrium with the lowest aggregate investments the players’
























Comparing (50) with (55) and (56) respectively, it is now readily
checked that, when (54) is satisﬁed, then
– if individuals exhibit competitive preferences (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then
there is simultaneous underinvestment both in the equilibrium











– if individuals exhibit inequity aversion (σ ≤ −ρ ≤ 0), then there is












– if individuals are concerned about social welfare (σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0), then
there is simultaneous overinvestment both in the equilibrium with
the highest aggregate investment (IA > Is
A and IB > Is
B) and in




B Conducting the experiment and instruc-
tions
The experiment was run at the Laboratory of the School of Economics at the
University of Jena. Participants were recruited by email with Orsee (Greiner,
2004) and could register for the experiment on the internet. At the beginning
of the experiment participants drew balls from an urn to determine their allo-
cation to seats. When seated participants then obtained written instructions
in German. In the following we give a translation of the instructions.
After answering control questions on the screen subjects entered the treat-
ment described in the instructions. After completing the treatment they an-
swered a short questionnaire on the screen and where then paid in cash. The
experiment was done with the help of z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Instructions to the experiment
You are participating in a scientiﬁc experiment that is sponsored by the
University of Jena and the University of St Andrews in Scotland. The in-
structions are simple. If you read them carefully then you can—depending
on your decision—gain a considerable amount of money which is paid to you
at the end of the game.
Your payoﬀ depends on your success in the experiment. During the exper-
iment you gain a certain number of “ECU” (Experimental Currency Units).
At the end of the experiment you will be paid in ¤. The conversion rate is
1 ¤ = 2000 ECU.
When you have questions, then please raise your hand. We will come
to you and answer your question. All participants of the experiment receive
the same instructions. The information on the screen is, however, only for
the individual participant. You are not allowed to have a look at the screen
of other participants and you are not allowed to talk to other participants.
Please concentrate on the experiment, do not read anything you brought
with you, do not try to start any other programs on the computer, do not
use your mobile phone. If you do not follow these rules you are excluded
from the experiment and you will not be paid.
You will play several rounds. In each round you play together with a
randomly selected other player. In each round you and the other player
choose each one number. Depending on the numbers you choose you receive
a payoﬀ in “ECU” which is determined according to a table. The following
example shows only a part of a table, in the experiment you see a complete
table.






























































With your number you choose a row in the table. The other player chooses
with his number a column in the table. The intersection determines a cell.
In the example, when you choose row 6 and the other player column 7, then
your payoﬀ is according to the cell 12
11 . Your payoﬀ is the boldface number
at the bottom left (11), the payoﬀ of the other player is the number at the
top right (12). With the help of the table you can determine your payoﬀ for
any combination of rows and columns. Your payoﬀ is, hence, determined by
the number you have chosen and by the number the other player has chosen.
To help you understand the experiment, please do the following:
• Click a number at the beginning of row as well as a number at the top
of a column. The row and the column will be shown in red. The cell
at the intersection will be circled.
The row you have chosen corresponds to your number. The column you
have chosen corresponds to the number you expect the other player will
chose.
• Of course, your expectation of what number the other player might
choose neither aﬀects your payoﬀ nor the payoﬀ of the other player. To
make a good decision, you can nevertheless think about the possible
choices of the other player.
• You can repeat this exercise as often as you wish. You can try diﬀerent
combinations of numbers for yourself and for the other player. When
you are satisﬁed with your choice please push the button OK .
As soon as the other player has completed his decision you see on your screen
which number he has chosen and which payoﬀ he has received.
Please write these values in each round into the table that you ﬁnd on
the back of this instruction sheet.
Please copy your results from the game into this table (ignore superﬂuous columns)
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Conﬁguration 2: π ∈ [π,1)
Figure 14: Two possible equilibrium conﬁgura-


















Figure 15: Equilibrium conﬁguration when σ ≤ ˆ σCESifo Working Paper Series 
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